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Abstract 
 
We analyse the process of mean reversion towards purchasing power parity (PPP) for a 
sample of Asian countries around the 1997 crisis. It is found that appreciation relative to 
PPP is evident prior to the 1997 crash period.  Correction occurs from 1997 onwards, a 
period marked by extreme movements in exchange rates with both appreciation and 
depreciation relative to the PPP rate over relatively short periods. The key result of this 
paper is that although reversion towards PPP is apparent for mean, though not statistically 
significant, it is clear that there is a substantial, statistically significant change in variance 
from 1997 onwards.  This result has implications both for economic modelling of crash 
periods and for appropriate choice of statistical tests. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent examination of the causes of the Asian currency crisis highlights the 
complex nature of exchange rate movements.  The International Monetary Fund (1997, 
1998a, 1998b) has stressed no less than five major features of the crisis: high volumes of 
“unproductive” capital inflows, low yields elsewhere pushing funds into the region, 
shortcomings and inconsistencies in domestic macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, 
various structural weaknesses particularly in the financial sector, failure of business to 
hedge interest rate and foreign exchange rate exposures and competitive devaluations. 
Other researchers such as Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Wyplosz (1998) suggest that 
financial panic must also be considered as a cause of the crisis.  It is argued that the 
increased general uncertainty associated with investing in Asian markets resulted in the 
severity of the crisis being greater than was warranted by the economic fundamentals.  
Political uncertainty was precipitated by cabinet reshuffles, changes in government in 
Thailand and South Korea, the health of the President of Indonesia and continual change 
and reversal of policy direction.  Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund’s 
insistence on the immediate closure of insolvent financial corporations added to the risk 
associated with transacting in the region (Radelet and Sachs 1998). 
 The use of purchasing power parity (PPP) theory to examine the Asian currency 
crisis countries provides a longer run view on exchange rate adjustments, and places 
some of the above arguments in perspective.  There is a general consensus in the 
international finance literature that PPP holds in the long run for developed, and many 
developing, countries (see Rogoff 1996).  In addition, since the mid 1980s, tests for mean 
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reversion indicate that the half-life of PPP deviations (the expected number of years for 
the exchange rate to decay by 50 percent) is between three and five years (Frankel 1986; 
Abuaf and Jorian 1990; Diebold, Husted and Rush 1991; Goldfajn and Valdes 1999).  
The question we examine in this paper is whether or not the Asian currency crisis 
countries fit the traditional mean reversion literature.  Was there evidence of 
overvaluation of the South East Asian country foreign exchange rate prior to the crash 
followed by reversion to PPP after the crash?  Is the focus on the mean alone warranted? 
 
2. Discussion 
 
2.1 Divergences and Mean Reversion  
 
Research to date has focused on the time series nature of real exchange rates, the 
ratio of the relevant price indices.  Analysis generally focuses on the duration of the 
divergence in exchange rates, measuring the time it takes for exchange rate to revert half 
of the way to the expected level, the half-life reversion or speed of adjustment.  Half-life 
estimates obtained from different sample periods include 4.6 years (Frankel, 1986), 3.3 
years (Abuaf and Jorion, 1990) and 2.8 years (Diebold, Husted and Rush, 1991).  Rogoff 
(1996) suggests these estimates are too large to be explained purely by transitory theories.  
More recently, Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) explored the mechanism by which 
divergences (appreciation relative to PPP) from expected level are corrected using 93 
countries during the period 1960-1994.  Goldfajn and Valdes provided evidence of 
asymmetry between the duration of the initial divergence and the subsequent reversion.  
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They found that, on average, the time it takes for reversion is about half the time of the 
initial divergence.  Furthermore, the greater the divergence the greater the probability of 
reversion.  These researchers concluded that the probability of collapse is an increasing 
function of the degree of appreciation.  In only 10 percent of cases where the divergence 
reached 25 percent was there a smooth reversion.  There is evidence of statistically 
significant mean reversion though there is evidence that the period of correction 
decreases with the magnitude of the initial divergence. There is also evidence of 
correction occurring at almost twice the rate of the initial divergence.  
 
 
2.2 The Asian Crisis Divergence 
 
It is proposed that in the lead-up to the crisis the currencies at its centre 
experienced departures from the PPP.  The main cause of these deviations was a 
combination of exchange rate restrictions and government policies aimed at attracting 
capital inflow. 
First, the currencies (with the exception of the Philippines Peso which operated 
under a clean float) were effectively pegged to the United States Dollar under managed 
float systems. This restriction tended to prevent an alignment of the exchange rate with 
the changes in the price levels.  Table 1 provides a summary of the exchange rate regimes 
in place over the period.   
  
   [Insert Table 1 here] 
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Second, there were government-induced pressures that resulted in the currencies 
being stronger than if left to market forces.  The governments actively encouraged 
foreign capital inflows through initiatives such as tax concessions and awarding of 
government contracts.  In addition, the stability of the currencies relative to the United 
States Dollar reduced exchange rate risk for investors and, given the attractive interest 
rate differentials, artificially increased capital inflows (Corsetti et al. 1998).  Finally, the 
implicit guarantees of government bailouts of financial institutions resulted in a 
misperception of the risk-return profile of investment in these countries resulting in the 
possibility of an “oversupply” of foreign capital (Krugman 1998).1 
The transitory departures from long run PPP levels created arbitrage opportunities 
that induced pressure on the exchange rate and price levels to realign.  Either the 
exchange rate had to depreciate or domestic price levels had to decrease relative to the 
foreign price level.  Given that exchange rates were generally pegged prior to the crisis, 
the only mechanism for adjustment was the price level; but as has been persuasively 
argued elsewhere, price levels tend to be relatively sticky in the short term (Rogoff, 
1996). 
The removal of the peg during the crisis period permitted exchange rate 
adjustments to eliminate the arbitrage opportunity.  Furthermore, a change in the 
perceived exchange rate risk, as well as the general risk-return profile of investments in 
the crisis countries, led to a reversal of the capital flows.  The result was depreciation of 
the currencies with respect to the USA and a period of extreme variation in the 
                                                               
1 Given the level of government involvement in the private sector, this misperception may have carried 
across to general lending to corporations as  well. 
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divergence between PPP and actual exchange rates over a number of years mainly driven 
by changes in exchange rates.   
 
2.3 The PPP Model and Hypothesis Formulation 
 
In order to examine the extent of divergences in Asian country exchange rates we 
first must define PPP.  We start with the standard statement of relative purchasing power 
as being determined by the following: 
 
[Pt+1/Pt] = [St+1/St][P*t+1/P*t]       [1] 
where  Pt is the domestic price index at time t; 
P*t is the foreign price index at time t; and 
St is the exchange rate (units of domestic currency per foreign currency). 
 
An alternative representation of equation [1] can be obtained by taking logs. 
 pt+1  =  st+1  +  p*t+1   
 st+1    =  pt+1  -   p*t+1         [2] 
 
where  st+1  =  natural log of St+1/St, (ln(St+1/St));  
pt+1 = ln(Pt+1/Pt ); and  
p*t+1 = ln(P*t+1/P*t ).  
 
Finally, we can re-define [2] as the divergence series according to the following equation: 
dt+1   =  st+1  –  pt+1  +  p*t+1   
=   ln(St+1) -  ln(St)  -  pt+1  +  p*t+1   
=   ln(St+1) -  ln(Sat+1)       [3] 
 
 where  ln(Sat+1)  = the PPP prediction of the exchange rate at t+1, (ln(St) - pt+1  + p*t+1).  
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In terms of the model presented in equation [3], if the actual exchange rate (St+1)  
is less than the PPP equilibrium exchange rate (Sat+1) in the lead-up to the currency crisis, 
then dt+1  < 0 (indicating an appreciation of the actual exchange rate relative to the PPP 
level in terms of USDs) .  If this were observed to occur over the lead-up period then the 
cumulative representation of dt, cdt, would have a negative slope.  A structural break is 
then expected in 1997 when massive foreign exchange rate corrections were reported in 
the financial literature.  This should result in a change in slope of cdt from negative to 
positive with the positive slope reflecting exchange rate correction.  Once correction is 
complete the cdt term should exhibit zero slope on average as PPP pricing divergence 
returns to a fairly random pattern.  Alternatively, if overshooting is evident the rise will 
be followed by a decrease in the cdt term to correct for the impact of overshooting.  Of 
course, as a result of the initial exchange rate shock there could be a series of structural 
changes driven by various economic and political changes that results in a rather drawn 
out period of adjustment rather than a simple overshooting argument.   
Figure 1 provides a graph of the cumulative PPP divergence over the 30-year 
period from 1970 to 1999.  There is evidence of fairly long cycles with periods of 
appreciation (negative sloped curve) followed by periods of depreciation (positive sloped 
curve) for each of the countries, except for Indonesia.  The crash of 1997 marks an abrupt 
change to this generally smooth relationship.  While it is difficult to draw conclusions 
about the PPP divergence for Indonesia, Figure 1 does suggest mean reversion in PPP 
over the period 1970 to 1999 for the remaining countries in the sample.  This applies 
even though the countries, excluding the Philippines, had pegged currencies.   
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    [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Given the previous discussion about mean reversion and given Figures 1, 2 and 3 
the period June 1992 to November 1999 is used in an attempt to capture the impact of the 
initial overvaluation followed by the crash and reversion to PPP for the countries in the 
sample.  The PPP divergence is fairly consistent for each of the five countries over the 5-
year sample period as is evident from Figures 2 and 3. There was a transitory departure 
from the PPP exchange rate (appreciation) for the Asian countries selected for analysis 
prior to the crash period that is reversed over the period 1997-1999.  When a period of 10 
years is selected for analysis (not reported here) there is evidence of steady appreciation 
for Indonesia and Thailand while this longer period is marked by periods of both 
appreciation and depreciation for South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines.  
 
    [Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
It is important to note that the proposition is not that PPP provides the sole 
explanation of the currency crisis, rather it is argued that one of the factors contributing to 
the currency depreciation was pressure by arbitrageurs in accordance with PPP theory.  In 
effect PPP provides an indication of problems with emphasis on direction, rather than 
magnitude. This is investigated by exploring the slope of cumulative deviations (cdt) 
graphically.  A statistical test is also undertaken to assess the impact of the crash on the 
mean and variance of the PPP monthly divergence.  
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3. Data 
 
Bilateral exchange rates between the crisis country currencies and the United 
States Dollar.  The time series spanned varying periods according to availability with the 
period June 1992 to November 1999 for Indonesia and South Korea, June 1992 to July 
1999 for Malaysia and June 1992 to September 1999 for both the Philippines and 
Thailand.  These were extracted from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics using Datastream.  Specifically, the United States Dollar series refer 
to end of month in units of national currency per United States Dollar. This variable is a 
standard choice in the literature (Frankel and Rose 1996). Datastream was also used to 
extract the required consumer price series from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics.2 Again this is a standard choice in the literature 
(Frankel and Rose 1996; Li 1998).  Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.  Although 
there is evidence of skewness and kurtosis, the Phillips-Perron t-test suggests stationary 
processes.  Further, there is little evidence of serial correlation though there is evidence of 
ARCH effects for Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.  
 
    [Insert Table 2 here] 
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Graphical Analysis 
 
 
Prior to statistical testing of the PPP divergence an inspection of the PPP 
divergence and cumulative PPP divergence is undertaken.  Figures 2 and 3 present the 
observed deviations and cumulative deviations for the period, June 1992 to November 
1999.  When examining the graphs, it is important to remember that the reversions need 
not be driven by changes in the exchange rate alone.  Changes in the price level could 
also explain some of the divergence though over much of the crisis period it is the foreign 
exchange rate that exhibits most volatility.   
Figures 1 and 3 highlight increasing pressures, as explained by PPP theory, for a 
devaluation of the currencies in the lead-up period to 1997.  These pressures, however, do 
not go very far in explaining the magnitude of the subsequent reversions.  Figure 3 
suggests that initially there was a fairly smooth appreciation in currencies relative to the 
USD over the 5 year period, June 1992 to 1997, but it offers little indication of the 
magnitude of changes observed after from 1997 onwards.  
The Philippines had accumulated the greatest percentage of overvaluation at the 
time of the crisis amounting to approximately 20% cumulative deviation from PPP.  
Given that the Peso had relatively few regulatory restrictions, it is somewhat surprising 
that it should deviate more than the other currencies.  One explanation for this finding is 
the close trading relationship that exists between the Philippines and other South East 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 The Consumer Price Index is employed in this research because it is likely to be the most accurately 
calculated, given the greater overall emphasis placed on this index.  Further, the Wholesale Price Index 
seems to produce similar results. The data series are not seasonally adjusted 
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Asian nations though capital flowed more freely into and out of the country leading to 
regular exchange rate adjustments both prior to and after the crash.  It is difficult to 
provide a clear explanation for this effect.  Furthermore, the volatility of PPP divergence 
after May 1997 was less severe for the Philippines.  This may have resulted from the fact 
that the Philippines financial system was better equipped to deal with the crisis as its 
currency had floated independently for some time prior to the crash.   
The cumulative deviations of the Thai Baht, Malaysian Ringit and Indonesian 
Ruppee, as portrayed in Figure 3 also demonstrates the increased competitive pressures in 
the 5 years preceding the crisis.  Nevertheless, there is evidence of appreciation in the 
currency relative to the USD in the immediate period before the crash followed by a 
period of volatility and depreciation of the currencies relative to the USD from 1997 to 
1999.   
The results for the South Korean Won, as indicated in Figure 3, suggest long term 
overvaluation prior to 1997 though there is evidence of some correction occurring late in 
1996 and early in 1997, with further adjustment in line with the other countries late in 
1997.  Figure 3 seems to indicate that competitive pressures did result in the Won 
depreciating, but this took place in the months preceding the crisis as well as after June 
1997.  This result supports the notion that the underlying pressures for the collapse of the 
Won stemmed from other factors such as the financial distress faced by major 
conglomerates (Corsetti et al. 1998 and Lee, 1999). 
To analyse the competitive devaluation argument (Corsetti et al. 1998; 
International Monetary Fund 1998a; 1998b), Figure 4 presents the cumulative deviations 
of the Malaysian Ringgit relative to the Thai Baht. The proposition is that the 
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depreciation of the Thai Baht contributed to pressures for other countries in the region to 
devalue.  The intuition is that the Thai Baht depreciation against the United Stated Dollar 
in late 1997 also resulted in it depreciating against the Malaysian Ringgit (since the 
Ringgit was effectively pegged to the United States Dollar), which in turn increased 
competitiveness pressures on the Ringgit.  In terms of PPP theory, the realigning of the 
Baht-Dollar exchange rate led to arbitrage opportunities between Thailand and Malaysia 
after May 1997, further adding to realignment pressures. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
The pre-June 1997 lead-up period is marked by pressure for the currencies to 
devalue (appreciation relative to PPP) in all cases but South Korea where over-valuation 
relative to PPP is less obvious at June 1997.  In South Korea’s case there is slow 
adjustment apparent from 1996 to 1997 as well as the major adjustment late in 1997.  The 
period following May 1997 is one of extreme volatility with evidence of both 
appreciation and depreciation over short periods accompanied by a tendency in each of 
the currencies for reduced volatility and a reversion to PPP by early 1999.     
 
4.2 Statistical Analysis 
 
If PPP pricing divergences are to explain the 1997 corrections then there should 
be evidence of overvaluation relative to PPP in the pre-1997 period followed by 
correction in 1997.  The statistical test for the impact of the crash involves estimation of 
both mean PPP divergence and variance in PPP divergence with a dummy variable to 
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capture the impact of the break in 1997.  The actual break point is set at June 1997 for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand while the break point for South Korea 
is set at January 1997 as there is some evidence of major changes in the Korean economy 
by the start of 1997.  Two equations are estimated simultaneously for each country using 
maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
 dt  = a1 + a2 It +  et 
 st2  =  b1 + b2 It         [4] 
 
where  a, b  = parameters 
It  = variable with value of one if date exceeds May 1997 (December 1997 
    for Korea) and zero otherwise 
 dt = PPP divergence 
 st2 = variance in PPP divergence 
 
   
 
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 3.  In all cases the average 
PPP divergence suggests appreciation of the currencies during the 5-year period prior to 
the 1997 break point.  The average PPP divergence ranges from 0.01% per month for 
Korea to 0.3% per month for the Philippines.  The average monthly depreciation of the 
currencies relative to PPP after the selected 1997 break point ranged from 0.7% per 
month for the Philippines to 2% per month for Indonesia. The asymmetry in the rates of 
appreciation and depreciation appear consistent with the findings of Goldfajn and Valdes 
(1999).  Although the results suggest correction of PPP pricing divergence after the 1997 
break point the difference between the average pre-crash PPP divergence and the average 
post-crash PPP divergence (estimated by the dummy variable parameter, a2) is not 
statistically significant in the regressions.  Cursory analysis of Figure 3 suggests that the 
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actual crash period may not extend to 1999.  The analysis was also conducted using a 
dummy variable set to one from 1997 to the end of 1998.  There was no change in the 
statistical test results though parameter estimates varied somewhat.  
The most statistically important result concerns the variance. There is evidence of 
greater than a one hundred-fold increase in variance of the PPP pricing divergence 
between the pre-crash period and 1997-1999 period for the countries excluding the 
Philippines.  This result highlights the extremely volatile nature of the foreign exchange 
markets during and after 1997. The Philippines was the only country where there was 
evidence of time changing variance in the PPP divergence.  The Philippines regression 
was re-estimated with an additional ARCH(1) term and, though there was some change in 
the parameter estimates, the results were consistent with the remainder of the sample. 3   
It could be argued that much of this change in volatility was due to the freeing up 
of the currencies (Table 1) but the Philippines was operating under a floating exchange 
rate regime throughout this period and it also exhibited a statistically significant change 
in volatility in 1997.   
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
One result apparent in Figure 3, after the initial burst of extreme variation in 1997 
and later, is the tendency for each of the currencies to depreciate beyond the levels 
observed at the beginning of the 5-year period selected for the study.   Figure 3 identifies 
                                                               
3 The ARCH model used for the Philippines is st
2  =  b1 + b2 It + b3 et
2 with b1  = 0.000194 (4.32*), b2  = 
0.001722 (2.29*), b3  = 0.658088 (2.27*).   The mean equation is dt  = a1 + a2 It +  et  with a1  =  -
0.001831 (-0.88),  and a2  = 0.015649 (1.60).  The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.    
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the build up of cumulative PPP divergence prior to June 1997 at varying levels followed 
by the dramatic adjustment after May 1997. For all the countries excluding Indonesia, the 
cumulative PPP divergence had begun to level by February 1999, indicating greater 
stability though at substantially depreciated rates relative to the pre-crash period (from 
around 50% depreciation for the Indonesian ruppee to essentially zero for the Philippines 
Peso).  The Philippines is particularly interesting in that the PPP divergence cumulated 
from June 1992 to May 1997 was essentially reversed by February 1999.   
Two important points that remain unexplained by the theory are the timing and 
magnitude of the reversions.  Chinn (1998) suggests that the duration of the overvaluation 
may matter as much as the magnitude.  He argues that long periods of overvaluation 
could have qualitatively different effects on the economy such as contemporaneous trade 
deficits.  As previously stated, this research is not an attempt to explain the optimal or 
equilibrium level of exchange rates at a given point in time since there are many factors 
which may be involved in such a proposition.  Rather, this paper sets out to analyse the 
time series behaviour of the relationship between PPP predicted exchange rates and 
observed exchange rates to focus on the question of whether mean reversion is apparent 
in crisis period exchange rate movements.     
One factor which may have an influence on the graphical comparisons, is that the 
international competitiveness pressures began building up over a long period of time (at 
least 5 years) and that this build up period varies across countries.  From Figure 1 it is 
apparent that changes in base year will affect the consistency of the cumulative PPP 
divergence and the average PPP divergence estimates for some countries (Malaysia and 
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Korea for example) and not for other countries (Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand). It 
is for this reason that the sample period of 5 years was selected.   
Finally, it is important to note that while there is some evidence of mean reversion 
in PPP divergence there is also strong statistical evidence of changes in the variance of 
the PPP divergence. The major economic changes, including political changes, IMF 
reaction and slow rating agency reaction may help to explain the increase in volatility of 
the PPP divergence from June 1997 though this does not fit well with a simple mean 
reversion model which generally assumes constant variance.  Given the results in this 
paper it would appear that PPP analysis should allow for the possibility of both changes 
in mean and variance.     
 
5. Summary 
 
We have adopted both graphical and statistical approaches in analysis.  The graphical 
analysis suggests four points. First, the countries experienced a build-up of international 
competitiveness pressures in the lead-up to the 1997 Asian currency crisis.  Second, 
reversion to PPP was marked by a change in variance, not entirely explained by the 
decision to float exchange rates.  Third, although the graphical approach indicated that in 
the five years leading up to the crisis there was a consistent increase in the 
competitiveness pressures for all the countries, the same level of consistency is not 
evident over longer periods.  Finally, the graphical analysis with respect to Thailand and 
Malaysia provided some support for the competitive devaluation argument as it suggests 
that the depreciation of one currency may place increased pressure on other currencies to 
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also depreciate.  It is apparent that the theory does not explain the magnitude or timing of 
the reversions.   
Statistical analysis suggests that there was evidence of a build-up of international 
competitiveness pressures over the period 1992-1997 with negative PPP pricing 
divergence observed on average.  This is followed by the crisis period, a period of 
extreme volatility coupled with currency depreciation.  A key finding in this paper is the 
change in both the mean PPP divergence and the volatility of PPP divergence over the 
crisis period.  This suggests that a simple constant variance, mean reverting process may 
be inadequate in explaining severe crises similar to the 1997 Asian crisis.  This has 
implications both for model building and for statistical testing.      
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Table 1 
Exchange Rate Regimes 1996-1999 
 
Regime Indonesia  South Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
 
September 1980 
 
 
other 
 
other 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
other 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
September 1985 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
September 1990 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
March 1996 
 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
September 1996 
 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
March 1997 
 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to 
composite 
basket 
 
June 1997 
 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
September 1997 
 
 
indep. float 
 
man. float 
 
man. float 
 
indep. float 
 
man. float 
 
March 1998 
 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
man. float 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
September 1998 
 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to USD 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
January 1999 
  
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to USD 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
April 1999 
 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
peg to USD 
 
indep. float 
 
indep. float 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.), various years.  
We have used the IMF characterisation of country exchange rate regimes as managed, independently 
floating, and pegged. The term “other” is used in 1980 where either the rate was independent or where it 
did not fall into the standard categories.  Similar details were not available from this source for 1975 or 
1970.   
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics  - PPP Divergence 
Statistic Indonesia  South Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
 
Number  
 
90 
 
90 
 
86 
 
88 
 
88 
Mean 0.0058 0.0027 0.0037 0.0010 0.0037 
Std. Dev. 0.1198 0.0532 0.0402 0.0357 0.0479 
Skewness 2.3328 3.0977 -1.4046 0.9336 -0.2371 
Kurtosis  16.4250 22.4022 15.7520 3.0244 14.1030 
 
Phillips-Perron 
Test (12 lags) 
 
 
-8.79* 
 
 
-8.78* 
 
 
-8.74* 
 
 
-8.55* 
 
 
-7.34* 
 
Autocorrelation 
     
-PPP error, X2(12) 17.10 12.27 4.98 4.72 13.79 
-PPP error sqrd.,  
   X2(12) 
 
15.50 
 
15.91 
 
23.36* 
 
44.62* 
 
37.19* 
 
Note:   
Number = number of monthly PPP divergence  observations available over the chosen study periods, Mean 
= average of the monthly PPP pricing divergence over the period, Std. Dev. = standard deviation of the 
monthly PPP pricing divergence, Skewness and Kurtosis = distribution characteristics, Phillips-Perron Test 
= unit root test, Autocorrelation = chi square test with 12 lags for autocorrelation for both the pricing 
divergence and the squared pricing divergence (an indication of the possibility of GARCH effects).   
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Table 3 
Tests for Change in Average PPP Divergence and Change in Variance in PPP 
Divergence with the Emerging Market Collapse of 1997 
 
Statistic Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Mean equation – 
intercept 
-0.001182 
(-1.25) 
-0.000195 
(-0.17) 
-0.000793 
(-0.48) 
-0.003793 
(-1.27) 
-0.001164 
(-1.29) 
Mean equation – 
dummy 
0.020200 
(0.48) 
0.007583 
(0.42) 
0.014380 
(0.93) 
0.014489 
(1.40) 
0.014900 
(0.95) 
Variance equation – 
intercept 
0.000043 
(7.70*) 
0.000069 
(7.47*) 
0.000157 
(9.18*) 
0.000510 
(7.70*) 
0.000044 
(5.12*) 
Variance equation –  
dummy 
0.040800 
(5.40*) 
0.006987 
(6.63*) 
0.004460 
(5.42*) 
0.002135 
(3.03*) 
0.006612 
(5.75*) 
 
- ARCH test, X2(1) 
 
1.13 
 
2.96 
 
0.25 
 
9.00* 
 
1.42 
- PPP error, X2(12) 17.01 12.25 5.77 4.26 14.47 
- PPP adj error, 
X2(12) 
 
12.48 
 
7.74 
 
5.71 
 
5.34 
 
8.20 
- PPP adj error sqrd. 
   X2(12) 
 
5.94 
 
5.60 
 
7.65 
 
15.99 
 
6.29 
 
Note: 
The model estimated is dt  = a1 + a2 It +  et with the variance defined as  st
2  =  b1 + b2It.  Maximum 
likelihood is used to obtain estimates of the parameters in the mean and variance equations and these are 
estimated simultaneously.  dt is the PPP divergence for the month t, st
2 is  the variance in PPP monthly 
divergence, It is a vector consisting of ones for the period June 1997 to April 1999 (January 1997 to April 
1999 for Korea) and zeros otherwise, error (e t) refers to the regression residuals, adj error refers to the 
regression residuals adjusted for the change in variance over the study period.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative PPP Deviations – February 1970 to November 1999 
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 Figure 2: PPP Deviations – June 1992 to November 1999 
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Figure 3: Cumulative PPP Deviations – June 1992 to November 1999 
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Figure 4: Malaysia Cumulative Deviations - Relative to Thailand 
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